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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 860326

v.
Category No. 2

JERRY DEE GRIFFITHS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented in this appeal:
1.

Has defendant demonstrated that admission at trial

of his post-arrest statements to a police officer, which were not
disclosed to him by the prosecutor pursuant to a discovery order
until shortly before trial, constituted reversible error?
2.

Did the trial court erroneously admit evidence of

defendants prior bad acts?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's requested instructions on eyewitness identification
testimony?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Jerry Dee Griffiths, was charged with
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-6-302 (1978), two counts of aggravated assault, a third degree
felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-5-103 (1978), and possession of
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second degree
felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503 (1978) (amended 1986)
(R. 9-11).

After the latter charge had been severed, a jury

found defendant guilty of the aggravated robbery and aggravated
assault charges (R. 33-35).
The trial court sentenced defendant to the Utah State
Prison for terms of five years to life for the aggravated robbery
and zero to five years for each of the aggravated assaults, the
sentences to run concurrently (R. 112-13).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of January 5, 1986, a manf later
identified as defendant, entered a video store in Salt Lake
County, approached Ron Smith, a clerk at the front counter,
revealed a hand gun tucked in his belt under his coat, and said
to Smith, "This is a .357 Magnum.
hero, I'll kill you."

It's loaded.

You try to be a

Defendant, who wore a Levi jacket and Levi

pants, a T-shirt, and a blue baseball cap over his straggly,
dirty blond hair, then ordered Smith to call the manager who was
in the rear of the store.

When the manager, Edward Failner,

appeared, defendant again revealed the gun, gave a warning
similar to that given Smith, and demanded the weekend receipts.
Noise from a back room alerted defendant to two other persons,
Randy and Everett Herbert, and they were ordered up front.

As

Failner moved toward the cash register, defendant, startled by
the sound of videos being returned in a night drop, pulled the
gun from his belt, cocked it, and pointed it in the direction of
the drop.

Once informed about the cause of the noise, defendant

pointed the gun at two of the persons behind the counter and
ordered them not to move.

Failner quickly assured defendant that

he would get whatever he wanted and placed the cash register
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drawer on the counter.

Defendant returned the gun to his belt,

pointing it toward his right leg and failing to uncock it.

After

Failner placed the till money in a bag given him by defendant,
defendant took the bag and left the store, heading in a westerly
direction (R. 159-68, 200-05).
Roger Mouritsen, who was at a gas station near the
video shop at the time of the robbery, hearp a gunshot and saw a
man who looked like defendant limping noticeably as he ran from
the direction of the shop.

Mouritsen indicated that the man was

wearing a baseball cap and a short, dark jacket; however, he
could not tell what color or kind of pants *fe had on (R. 236-40) .
The next day, a doctor treated defendant for) a gunshot wound to
his right foot, which appeared to have been caused by a .38
caliber or high velocity .22 caliber weapon lone or two days
before.

The doctor considered the wound consistent with that

caused by a gun tucked in the belt portion of a person's pants,
but acknowledged that it also could have occurred during a manual
exchange of the weapon between defendant anc another person (R.
138-51).
When shown photo lineups by the police two days after
the robbery, Failner and the Herberts identified defendant as the
robber (R. 207-09, 250; St. Ex. 2 ) . At an in-person lineup held
on February 4, Failner positively identified defendant, but Randy
I
Herbert selected another individual as the gunman* Everett
Herbert and Ron Smith were unable to make any identifications (R.
176, 212-14, 270-74, 286-87; St. Ex. 8, 9, lol 11, 1 3 ) .
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At trial, Failner, Smith, and the Herberts all
positively identified defendant as the robber (R. 172-73, 206,
277-79, 293) . Three of them noted that the robber had an upper
tooth or teeth missing, but acknowledged that defendant appeared
to have no missing teeth in court.

It was established, however,

that a police officer noticed that defendant had teeth missing
when he arrested him five days after the robbery, and that
defendant normally wore an upper dental plate (R. 177, 194-95,
220-21, 252, 290, 298, 302). Smith explained that he was unable
to identify defendant at the lineup because defendant's eyes were
not as visible there as they were in the photograph or in court
(R. 179-80, 191). Andf he did not indicate to anyone that any
memoers of the lineup had characteristics similar to the robber's
because he did not know to do that (R. 198). Randy Herbert
admitted that she had identified the wrong person at the lineup
(apparently fooled by the similarities between that person's hair
and dress and the robber's), but she was able to state with
certainty that State's Exhibits 1 and 2, photographs of
defendant, were of the person who robbed the store (R. 271-84).!
Finallyr Everett Herbert explained that he could not identify
defendant at the lineup because his hair color appeared to be
different.

However, he was able to positively identify Exhibits

1 and 2 as the robber (#2 being the photo he picked out of a
photo lineup shown to him before trial) (R. 291-94).

* Ms. Herbert first saw Exhibit 1 the morning of trial; she
picked Exhibit 2 out of the photo lineup shown to her several
days after the robbery (R. 276-80).

Defendant called several witnesses in his defense.
Randy and Everett Herbert testified that tlhey were either unable
to identify defendant at the in-person linkup or identified
another person as the robber (R. 270-73, 285-87).

Defendant's

mother testified that she noticed his injured foot on the morning
of January 5 when he came to visit her at the hospital.

When

asked about the foot, defendant told her that it had been injured
in an accident involving a Jeep.

She also stated that she had

never seen defendant with blond hair, but khew that he had a full
set of top dentures (R. 299-302).

Defendant's ex-wife testified

that she talked with defendant on January 5 about his foot which
had apparently been injured by a Jeep (R. 3ll-18).

And, a

neighbor testified that he noticed defendant's bad foot on the
morning of January 5 (R. 324).
Defendant's primary witness was hils girlfriend, Darlene
Newsorae, who claimed that defendant's injury had been caused on
January 4 by the accidental discharge of a gUn when it was handed
to defendant on the front porch of his home by a man named either
Dan or Don (she could not remember his exact name).

She also

stated that she and defendant spent the entirfe evening of January
5 at the home of defendant's mother.

Finally!, she acknowledged

that defendant wore a full upper plate of dentures (R. 327-52).
In rebuttal, the State called Detective Ron Edwards
who, upon arresting defendant for the instant robbery, was told
by defendant that he had spent the entire evehing of January 5
alone at his residence and that he had injured his foot on that
date when a gun handed to him by a person nam^d Mike had
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accidentally discharged (R. 245, 361-63)•

The State also had a

weapons expert testify that his investigation of the front porch
at defendant's home had uncovered no evidence of a gunshotf
although he was unable to state with scientific certainty that a
shot had not been fired there (R. 377-82A).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant fails to demonstrate that he was
significantly prejudiced by a State witness's improper reference
to an unrelated warrant concerning defendant*

Nor does he show

that the trial court so abused its discretion in admitting the
identification testimony of a person not at the scene of the
instant robbery that a likelihood of injustice was created.
Therefore, his claims of evidentiary error are not grounds for
reversal.
Although the prosecutor appears to have violated the
trial court's discovery order, the circumstances of this case
persuasively establish that there is no reasonable likelihood
that absent the prosecutor's error, the outcome of trial would
have been more favorable for defendant.
Finally, under well settled precedent from this Court,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give
defendant's requested cautionary eyewitness identification
instruction.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE
EITHER AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE
TRIAL COURT IN ADMITTING CERTAIN EVIDENCE
OR ANY SIGNIFICANT PREJUDICE SUFFERED AS
A RESULT OF THE ADMISSION OF THE CHALLENGED
EVIDENCE, HE IS NOT ENTITLED fro A REVERSAL
OF HIS CONVICTION,
Defendant claims that he is entitled to a reversal of
his conviction because the trial court erroneously admitted

T
evidence of prior misconduct through the testimony of Detective
Ron Edwards and Yvonne Silcox.

This claim is without merit.

Defendant cites Edwards's testimony about an unrelated
warrant concerning defendant as evidence that should have been
i

excluded under Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 2

That testimony, which was

unintentionally elicited by the prosecutor, resulted in an offthe-record discussion between the court and counsel at side bar,
after which the court admonished the jury to disregard Edwards's
statement (R. 253-54).

After the jury retired to deliberate,

defendant stated on the record that he had made a specific
objection to Edwards's testimony during the side bar discussion
and had requested a mistrial on the ground that evidence of other
misconduct by defendant had erroneously been presented to the
2 Rule 404(b) provides:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence ot other
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show th&t he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, b£ admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, Opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, ideritity, or absence
of mistake or accident.
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jury (R. 389-90).

The court noted the objection and motion# but

indicated it would stand on its prior ruling against defendant
(R. 391).
Rule 404(b) clearly states that evidence of other
wrongdoing by the accused is not admissible to prove his bad
character or propensity to commit crime.
P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986).

State v. Pierce, 722

The trial court obviously applied

this principle when it admonished the jury to disregard Edwards's
improper reference to the warrant.

Because that reference was

very brief, with no details given of the circumstances giving
rise to the issuance of the warrant or the offense to which it
related, there was little chance that the jury had been
prejudiced significantly.
203 (Utah 1986).

£f.

State v. Jensen, 727 P.2d 201,

Indeed, the court's prompt and decisive action

in response to the improper testimony obviated any harm that
might have resulted.

£f.

State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185, 187

(Utah 1986); State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985).
Under the circumstances, the erroneous presentation of the
evidence to the jury was harmless error because there is no
reasonable likelihood that without the error there would have
been a different result in defendant's trial.

See State v.

Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 129 (Utah 1986) (citing State v.
Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982)); Utah R. Evid. 103(a); Utah
R. Crim. P. 30(a) (UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-30(a)).

In short, this

minor evidentiary error could not have undermined confidence in
the verdict.

State v. Knight, 53 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 16-17,

P.2d

(Utah 1987) (interpreting Rule 30(a)).

,
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Silcox testified that she saw defendant in her store
(which was not the store involved in this case) on December 23,
1985, and that she picked defendant out of the lineup conducted
on February 4, 1986.

She recalled that defendant had several

teeth missing when she saw him in the store, and that his hair
was "longer and more yellowish-blond" then than at the time of
the lineup (R. 226-29)•

The prosecutor offered this evidence as

corroborative of the robbery victims1 descriptions of how
defendant appeared at the time of the robbery (before the
lineup).

As the prosecutor noted, defendant had significantly

changed his appearance between the date of the robbery and that
of the lineup.

Defendant argued that Silcox could not give her

identification testimony without leaving the impression that she
had been a robbery victim of defendant in an incident unrelated
to that for which he was being tried (R. 154-55).

The trial

court disagreed, stating:
If she testifies as to having seen him on
a date in December, without going into the details
of under what circumstances, but nevertheless
identifies him, I see no problem.
(R. 155).
It is well settled that "the trial courtfs ruling on
the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent a
showing that the trial court so abused its discretion as to
create a likelihood that injustice resulted."
710 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1985).

State v. Royball,

Accord State v. Gray, 717 P.2d

1313, 1316 (Utah 1986); State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209
(Utah 1985); Utah R. Evid. 103(a).

Although defendant chooses to

characterize it otherwise, Silcox1s testimony hardly made clear
-9-

that she was the victim of a prior unrelated robbery committed by
defendant.

There is little chance that the jury would naturally

and necessarily construe her observation of defendant at another
store and her subsequent presence at a lineup as evidence of a
prior crime by defendant.

Therefore, the trial court did not

plainly violate Rule 404(b) or so abuse its discretion as to
create a likelihood of injustice, and its ruling should be
affirmed.

Gray, 717 P.2d 1316; Rovball, 710 P.2d at 169.
POINT II
BECAUSE THERE IS NO REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD
THAT ABSENT THE PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO
DISCLOSE CERTAIN EVIDENCE TO DEFENDANT,
THE OUTCOME OF TRIAL WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE
FAVORABLE FOR DEFENDANT, REVERSAL OF HIS
CONVICTION IS NOT WARRANTED.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to discover

which sought, inter alia, disclosure of Malll written or
recorded statements of the Defendant" (R. 17). After a hearing,
the trial court ordered the prosecution to comply with
defendant's discovery request (R. 25). At trial, the prosecutor
called Detective Ron Edwards as a rebuttal witness.

When it

became apparent that Edwards was about to testify to the
conversation he had with defendant upon arresting him for the
instant robbery, defense counsel asked permission to approach the
bench.

After an off-the-record discussion at side bar, Edwards

recounted defendant's post-arrest statements, which are set forth
in this brief's statement of facts (R. 358-64).
5-6.

Br. of Resp. at

After the jury had retired for deliberations, defendant

placed his prior off-the-record objection to Edwards's testimony
on the record, stating that the prosecutor had failed to disclose
-10-

to him, until minutes before trial, tne statements ne maae to
Edwards.

He then moved for a mistrial, but the court denied this

relief (R. 389-91) .
On appeal, defendant argues that His conviction should
be reversed because he was significantly prejudiced when the
trial court, once informed that the prosecution was about to
present evidence it had failed to disclose to defendant pursuant
to the court's discovery order, did not either exclude that
evidence or grant defendant's request for a n^istrial.

See Utah

R. Crira. P. 16(g) (UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-16(g) (1982)).3
Because there appears to be no dispute that tjhe prosecutor did
not fully comply with the discovery order as it related to
defendant's statements to Edwards,4 see Utah k. Crim. P. 16(a)
(UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-16(a) (1982)); State V. Knight, 53 Utah
Adv. Rep. 13, 14-16,

P.2d

,

(1987), whether the trial

court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motions to
exclude or for a mistrial "depends entirely upbn a determination
of whether the prosecutor's failure to produce| the requested
information resulted in prejudice sufficient tb warrant reversal
3 Rule 16(g) provides:
If at any time during the course of the proceedings
it is brought to the attention of the court that a party
has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant
a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing
evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other
order as it deems just under the circumstances.
4

Nothing in the record indicates that the prosecutor argued that
there had been no discovery violation or that t\\e disclosure of
defendant's statements immediately before trial satisfied the
court's discovery order.
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under [Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) (UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-30(a)
(1982)]," the harmless error rule.5

Knight, 53 Utah Adv. Rep. at

16.
In Knight, the Court thoroughly analyzed the operation
of Rule 30(a) in the context of a discovery violation by the
prosecution (wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory evidence).
It clarified the meaning of its previous interpretations of Rule
30(a) that "an error warrants reversal 'only if a review of the
record persuades the court that without the error there was a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant,'" by holding that "Iflor an error to require reversal,
the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high
to undermine confidence in the verdict."

Knight, 53 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 16-17 (citations and footnote omitted; emphasis in
original).

Under Knight,

when the defendant can make a credible argument
that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the
defense, it is up to the State to persuade the
court that there is no reasonable likelihood
that absent the error, the outcome of trial
would have been more favorable for the defendant.
53 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17. The State "can meet this burden by
showing that despite the errors, the outcome of trial merits
confidence and there is no reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for defendant."

5

Ld. at 18.

Rule 30(a) states:
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall
be disregarded.

12-

Here, the prosecutor offered Edwards's rebuttal
testimony in an effort to impeach defendant's chief alibi
witness, Darlene Newsome.

Introduction of defendant's post-

arrest statements to Edwards, which were incpnsistent with
Newsome1s testimony in a number of significant respects, clearly
could have cast doubt on the credibility of Newsome1s explanation
for the gunshot wound to defendant's foot.6

However, the State

presented substantial evidence in its case-in-chief which
seriously undermined defendant's alibi evidence.

Compelling

direct and circumstantial evidence established that defendant was
the person who robbed the video store and suffered a gunshot
wound from a gun tucked in his belt as he ran from the scene.
This evidence alone powerfully rebutted defendant's suggestion
that he was at his mother's home at the time of the robbery and
suffered the injury to his foot the day before when a gun handed
to him by another person accidentally discharged.
Edwards's testimony had only secondary value.

In comparison,

Unlike the

defendant in Knight, 53 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17-18, defendant does
not specifically state what effect the nondisclosure had on
pretrial strategy, the preparation of his case, or his strategy
at trial.

Perhaps he would have reconsidered u£ing Newsome as an

alibi witness, had he known that the State would present his
post-arrest statements.

On the other hand, given the substantial

evidence presented by the State in its case-in-chief, defendant

0

This evidence was inculpatory insofar as it impeached
defendant's primary alibi evidence. The prosecution, of course,
was aware of defendant's alibi defense prior to tibial (R. 26).

may well have chosen to take his chances with Newsomef even
knowing the inconsistencies between her anticipated testimony and
his statements to Edwards.

Finally, Edwards's rebuttal testimony

aside, Newsome's account of an accidental shooting was not
consistent with the testimony of other defense witnesses, who
testified that defendant told them that a Jeep had caused the
injury to his foot (R. 301f 318).
Assuming that defendant has made a credible argument
that the prosecutor's error impaired his defense, the
circumstances of defendant's case, which are outlined above,
persuasively establish that the error did not unfairly prejudice
the defense.

See Knight, 53 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17.

the verdict simply was not undermined.

Ibid.

Confidence in

See also United

States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (erosion-of-confidence
criterion applied in a case involving nondisclosure of
impeachment evidence); State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 275-76
(Utah 1985) (defendant failed to show a "reasonable probability"
that the undisclosed evidence would have affected the outcome of
trial); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985) (failure
to disclose evidence did not so mislead defendant as to cause
prejudicial error); State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1981)
(surprise testimony was without prejudicial effect).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO GIVE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED CAUTIONARY
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION INSTRUCTION.
The trial court refused to give defendant's requested
cautionary instruction on eyewitness identification, which was

modeled after the one recommended in United States v. Telfaire,
469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

Defendant claims that this was

reversible error.
Prior to its recent opinion in State v. Long, 721 P.2d
483 (Utah 1986), this Court had repeatedly held that special
instructions on eyewitness identification ("Telfaire"
instructions) were not mandatory; instead, the decision on
whether to give Telfaire instructions was discretionary with the
trial court.

E.g. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 346 (Utah

1985); State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985); State v.
Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1984); State v. Watson, 684 P.2d
39, 40 (Utah 1984).

Because defendant's case was tried prior to

the Long decision, the old discretionary standard, rather than
the mandatory standard adopted for prospective application in
Long, 721 P.2d at 492, applies to defendant's case.

Under the

discretionary standard, the circumstances of the eyewitness
identifications in defendant's case, unlike those identified in
Long, 721 P.2d at 487-88, and State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378, 1381
(Utah 1986), did not require the court to give the cautionary
instruction.

This is consistent with decisions of this Court in

similar cases.
P.2d
1984).

,

E.g. State v. Remington, 54 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4,
(1987); State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833 (Utah

S^e also Jonas, 725 P.2d at 1380-81 (summarizing the

circumstances of eyewitness identifications in pre-Long cases
where there was no abuse of discretion in not giving a Telfaire
instruction).
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's
^j~Jh~—

convictions should be affirmed.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this J^£jcfay of April, 1987.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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